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Gov’t seeking to expand benefits to former presidents, Ram slams move
Following a three-month hiatus in parliamentary sittings, the Government on June 5th initiated moves to repeal the Former Presidents (Benefits and Other Facilities) Act 2015 and replace it with a new one that sets no caps to the benefits now being received by those who served in the highest office of the land.
The move has sparked consternation in some circles and raised questions about the government’s priorities.
Senior Minister in the Office of the President with Responsibility for Finance, Dr. Ashni Singh introduced the Bill – Former Presidents (Benefits and Other Facilities) Act 2026 – and it was read for the first time at the last sitting.
According to the explanatory memorandum of the Bill it seeks to put into law certain benefits and other facilities to be enjoyed by every former President.
“Having regard to the services rendered by former Presidents and the dignity attached to the office of the President, it is considered necessary to extend certain amenities and benefits to them during the remainder of their lifetime,” it was stated.
While the Act will empower the finance minister to make necessary regulations for giving effect to the legislation it made clear that Clause 4 of the Bill repeals the one that was passed by the former APNU+AFC coalition government in 2015.
The uncapped benefits that the beneficiaries of the Bill will receive include “provision of utilities at the place of residence, services of personal, technical and household staff, payment of health-care related expenses, for self and dependant members of family, full time personal security and Presidential Guard Service arrangements at the residence and taxable status identical to that of a serving President”.
Commentator Christopher Ram roasted the government over the bill.
In a comment on Friday to Kiskadee Watch, he said “The Presidents Benefits Bill tells you everything about this Government’s priorities. Parliament has sat idle for the better part of four months – no scrutiny, no questions, no relief for the cost of living – and the first thing it stirs to do is restore tax-free, uncapped benefits for the handful of men who have already held the highest office. A former President would again draw utilities, staff, vehicles, security, and medical care without limit, plus a tax exemption identical to a serving President, on top of a pension already at seven-eighths of the sitting President’s salary – while the worker on the minimum wage is too poor even to be taxed.
“We need not even make the argument. We can recall then Finance Minister Winston Jordan, who in 2015 called these very benefits “vulgar” and an entitlement that “degrades servant leadership.” This Bill simply brings back the vulgarity. It shows how the ruling cabal sees the top office – not as a responsibility laid down, but as a plum to be enjoyed for life at the public’s expense. Strip away the talk of “dignity” and what remains is greed”.
In 2015 the then APNU+AFC Government had repealed what it described as a “vulgar” insult to hardworking taxpayers who had had to foot the bill.
At the time the Bill was passed the then opposition – the PPP/C – was not in the House as it was yet to take up the opposition seats in the National Assembly.
The benefits in the previous Bill were enacted by the then Bharrat Jagdeo-led PPP/C administration in 2009 and were defended by then President Donald Ramotar in 2013, when he vetoed a similar bill passed by APNU and AFC to cap benefits.
In 2015 Jagdeo was the only former president who had benefitted under the then Act. Ramotar, former Prime Minister Samuel Hinds, who had served as president for 288 days in 1997 after the death of Dr Cheddi Jagan and prior to the election of Janet Jagan and former President David Granger will all now benefit from the uncapped benefits once the Bill becomes law.
The explanatory memorandum of the 2015 Bill had said that its was to repeal the Former Presidents (Benefits and Other Facilities) Act of 2009, and to replace it with the new Act, to provide greater specificity “especially if account is taken of the fact that the former president is eligible for a pension which is 7/8’s that of the president in office.”
During his address, then Minister of Finance Jordan described the uncapped, taxpayer-funded benefits package set out for former presidents in the 2009 Act as “vulgar”, adding that “It lacks the imprimatur of important moral values”.
Jordan gave the example of a retired graduate headmistress who drew a pension of $86,857 a month after working for over 34 years and which she would receive for the rest of her life. The plight of the teacher demonstrates the “absurdity” of the “anomalous situation,” he had said, where a former president then received $1.4M, which would be automatically increased whenever the sitting president’s salary is increased.
Every Man, Woman and Child in Guyana Must Become Oil-Minded – Column 189: 13th June, 2026
Exxon’s 2025 Financial Statements – and What It Has Taken Out
Overview
ExxonMobil Guyana Limited this week filed its audited financial statements for the year ended 31st December 2025. Once again, the numbers are staggering: from a 45% interest in one block, total comprehensive income of $982,476M – very nearly one trillion Guyana dollars – after charging income tax it does not pay. It took Guyana fifty-nine years to build its first trillion-dollar budget; Exxon’s minority slice approaches that in a single year, for foreign shareholders, in under a decade.
In the interest of brevity, I will not trouble readers with a detailed review of the company’s income statement and the balance sheet: they speak for themselves, jarring the ears of every self-respecting Guyanese. Instead, this column steps back to the larger picture they occupy – what the accounts and the Petroleum Agreement, read together, reveal about how much of this nation’s oil, and this nation’s money, leaves the country and how little stays. How we came to be imprisoned to such terms, and by whom, is another story.
The “50-50” that is not equal
At a press conference to share the financial statements, Vice President John A. Colling was asked why, in a “50-50” agreement, the oil companies take so much more than the Government. We know Colling. He was the same individual who in 2024 announced a “60%” revenue rise when it was 56% – volunteered that “75% of all revenues” currently go to cost recovery, that “you see that reflected in the IFRS financial statements,” and that the 50-50 falls on profit oil “after recovery of costs.”
Colling does not seek to confuse revenue with profit oil; he distinguishes them. Under the Agreement the 50-50 bites only on profit oil – what survives after the 2% royalty (Article 15.6) is set aside, and up to 75% of each month’s production lifted as cost oil (Article 11.2). On his own figure, 25 cents in the dollar reaches the profit-oil pool, and the State’s half of that, with its royalty, is about 14 cents. He explained, in the language of reassurance, why a “fifty-fifty” hand the nation one-seventh of its own oil. But then promised the media that improvement would come.
What is interesting is that Colling undermined the assertion in the financial statements about IFRS when he introduces the motion of petroleum accounting which was never before mentioned by him or his predecessors. In any case, all he did was confirm suspicions with this new information.
IFRS, and the cost that disappears
Never the less, his claim that “You see that reflected in the IFRS financial statements” is one that the accounts will not bear. Indeed, that statement undermines the audit report validating the financial statements. The Agreement suggests the recovery of costs as incurred, with no depreciation schedule for capital (Annex C); IFRS does the opposite, capitalising that sum and releasing it slowly as depreciation – $300,758M, about 18% of revenue, against total costs of just 29%. What is beyond doubt is that a 75% cash recovery is nowhere on the face of the accounts. The company plead “petroleum accounting”. The auditors certify full IFRS and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Guyana mandates it, and the public is confused. Either the cost recovery belongs in these statements and must be disclosed, or it is a separate computation that must be reconciled to them. Exxon does neither, offering no bridge from the Agreement’s waterfall to its published profit. The largest charge of all in the income statement – depreciation – has no note. I can think of no IFRS that supports recovery of a hugely substantial cost being undisclosed in the financial statements. This omission explains why and how the income statement of one of the three contractors discloses a 57% margin – completely out of line with the 12.5% earned by the country.
What Exxon has taken out, and what Guyana finances
Since first oil, on its 45% alone, Exxon has earned about $3.2 trillion – $607,186M by the end of 2022 with nothing paid out, and almost $2 trillion more since. It took nothing out until 2024; then it repatriated $1.14T in two years, untaxed. Set that against every dollar of capital the parent has ever contributed – $1,127,835M: the cash taken out has now overtaken the entire investment ever made. Exxon has been made whole, and $2,062,951 million of profit still sits undistributed, waiting to leave.
On top of all this we pay its taxes – some $630B in three years on the 45% alone – from our own profit oil. And this is Exxon’s 45%; add Hess and CNOOC and the take more than doubles.
What Exxon has taken out – EMGL’s 45% interest only (G$ millions)
| EMGL – 45% interest (G$ millions) | Amount |
| Total profit earned since first oil | 3,199,407 |
| Repatriated to head office (2024–2025) | (1,136,455) |
| Undistributed profit at 31 December 2025 | 2,062,951 |
| Capital contributed by the parent | 1,127,835 |
| Article 15.4 tax borne by Guyana, 2023–2025 | 629,929 |
Conclusion
Exxon has not changed its strategy, nor even the man who reads the script: the same Mr. Colling, merely promoted. The architecture stands exactly where the Coalition built it and the PPP/C maintains it – a 2% royalty, up to 75% cost recovery, a 50-50 on the crumbs, no ring-fencing, a Tax Order that pays the contractor’s taxes from our own oil, and a cleanup bill that Guyana partly funds. The oil is leaving by the tanker-load, the profit by the trillion, and the money we pay to keep it sweet leaves dressed up as the company’s own income. Our patrimony, the profit it yields, and our own treasury – three things not taken from Guyana but given away, and counting.
Walter Rodney, assassinated 46 years ago, and whose memory we recall today, must be wondering how we got here. We will try to answer that question next week as we close the round-up of the Contractors’ 2025 financial statements.
Review: Nationalisation of Bookers on the Legal Front by Mohamed Shahabuddeen
Written only days after the conclusion of the negotiations for the nationalisation of Bookers in 1976, Mohamed Shahabuddeen’s manuscript offers a rare insider’s account of one of the most significant episodes in Guyana’s economic history. Published fifty years later as a commemorative edition, the work remains an invaluable legal and historical record.
This commemorative publication has an unusual history. While researching taxation and the sugar industry at the Attorney General’s Chambers, I was shown a faded and almost unreadable manuscript by Dr. Mohamed Shahabuddeen. Recognising its significance, I sought the support of the University of Guyana. When technological efforts to restore the text proved unsuccessful, eight students from my 2025/26 Law of Corporate Management class painstakingly reconstructed the manuscript, making possible its publication fifty years after it was written. The effort was worthwhile. Nationalisation of Bookers on the Legal Front is an important contribution to Guyana’s legal and historical literature.
Mohamed Shahabuddeen
Dr. Shahabuddeen requires little introduction. Attorney General, Justice of Appeal, Judge of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, he was among the most accomplished jurists produced by the Caribbean. Less frequently acknowledged, though equally significant, was his contribution as a historian of Guyana’s constitutional development and legal system. Few others combined legal scholarship, historical insight and literary skill with comparable authority.
The manuscript was completed on 28 May 1976, only three days after the conclusion of negotiations between the Government of Guyana and Booker McConnell concerning the nationalisation of the company’s interests in Guyana. Shahabuddeen explains that he undertook the task at the request of Gavin Kennard, then Minister of Agriculture and leader of the Government’s negotiating team, who believed that such an important episode should not pass into history without a Guyanese account. Kennard’s foresight is vindicated by this publication. Without his intervention, an important chapter in the country’s economic and legal history might have been left to memory and speculation.
That immediacy is one of the work’s greatest strengths. This is not a history written years after the event, shaped by fading recollections or subsequent political interpretation. It is a contemporaneous reconstruction prepared by one of the principal participants. Shahabuddeen was not merely recording history; he was helping to make it.
The book examines the major legal issues arising during the negotiations, including allegations of confiscation, compensation for improvements to State lands, rehabilitation assets and standing cane. Through a detailed reconstruction of the exchanges between himself and Peter Webster, Q.C., representing Bookers, Shahabuddeen provides a fascinating account of the legal reasoning employed by both sides.
At one level, the work is a study in legal advocacy. Readers are treated to rigorous argument on questions of property, compensation and international law. Yet the manuscript is much more than a technical legal document. Running throughout is a broader examination of the relationship between law, history and justice in a post-colonial society.
A recurring theme is Shahabuddeen’s concept of “substantial justice”. Legal rights, he argues, cannot be considered in isolation from the historical circumstances in which they arose. The debates therefore extend beyond narrow questions of valuation and compensation to encompass the economic legacy of colonialism, the concentration of economic power and the responsibilities of an independent state seeking to reshape its future.
These arguments remain relevant today. Although the events occurred half a century ago, the questions they raise continue to resonate. How should a newly independent nation address economic structures inherited from colonial rule? What balance should be struck between private property rights and broader social objectives? What role should historical circumstances play in determining legal and economic outcomes? Shahabuddeen does not merely raise these questions; he confronts them directly and with considerable intellectual force.
Whether or not readers agree with all his conclusions, they will be impressed by the quality of the analysis. The manuscript demonstrates a mind equally at ease with legal doctrine, economic history and public policy. It also reveals the qualities that would later distinguish Shahabuddeen on the international stage: precision of thought, clarity of expression and a deep concern for fairness.
One of the book’s most attractive features is its treatment of opposing views. Bookers’ Peter Webster emerges not as a caricatured adversary but as a formidable advocate whose arguments are presented with care and respect. The exchanges between the two lawyers constitute some of the most engaging passages in the book and provide a masterclass in professional advocacy. The reader gains the impression that Shahabuddeen relished intellectual contest, not because he sought victory at all costs, but because he respected the process of reasoned argument.
Equally engaging are Shahabuddeen’s observations of the personalities involved in the negotiations. Readers expecting a dry legal treatise will be pleasantly surprised. The manuscript contains moments of wit, humour and vivid description that reveal Shahabuddeen’s gifts as a writer.
His sketches of colleagues and participants are particularly memorable. He describes Edgar Heyliger, Chartered Accountant and member of the Guyana Team, with his “smilingly alert eyes over a Ho Chi Minh beard” and captures the personalities around the negotiating table with the eye of a novelist. Michael Caine, Bookers Chairman is portrayed as someone whose previous encounters with lawyers had largely been confined to television. Elsewhere, Shahabuddeen recounts incidents from the negotiations with a light touch that humanises both the participants and the process. His recounting of the Hindu groom who would not eat until satisfied of the dowry was strategic and eased tension at a critical moment. These passages provide welcome relief from the technical legal discussions while enriching the narrative.
The humour is never forced. Rather, it reflects a writer secure enough in his scholarship to recognise the humanity behind serious public affairs. Indeed, one of the pleasures of the book is discovering that the distinguished jurist was also a gifted storyteller. The manuscript succeeds not only because of the strength of its legal analysis but because of the elegance and readability of its prose.
The publication of this work is therefore a welcome addition to the documentary record of Guyana’s development. It preserves a Guyanese account of one of the most significant economic and political decisions in the country’s history and does so through the eyes of one of its principal participants. Historians will value it as a primary source. Lawyers will appreciate the quality of its advocacy and analysis. General readers will enjoy its narrative style and its insights into the personalities involved.
Fifty years after its composition, Nationalisation of Bookers on the Legal Front remains both relevant and illuminating. It is at once legal argument, historical record and memoir. More importantly, it reminds us of the importance of preserving the documents through which a nation tells its own story.
For that reason alone, the recovery and publication of this manuscript represent a valuable service to scholarship and to Guyana. More significantly, they have returned to public view the voice of one of Guyana’s greatest legal minds reflecting on a defining moment in the nation’s history. That voice deserves to be heard.
‘Govt. crafting law to shield Development Bank from oversight’ – Ram
…flags lack of independent supervision
…no accountability safeguards and clear lending priorities
…says $40B at risk
(Kaieteur News) – The proposed Guyana Development Bank may be a promising initiative aimed at supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), but Chartered Accountant and Attorney Christopher Ram is warning that flaws in the legislation governing the institution could leave billions of taxpayers’ dollars vulnerable to misuse.
In an invited comment, Ram, an advocate for good governance told this publication that the proposed legislation raises serious concerns about governance, accountability and financial prudence.
He said, “The most troubling feature is that the Bank is exempt from the Financial Institutions Act and therefore from oversight by the Bank of Guyana. Unlike every other financial institution, it will not be subject to independent prudential supervision, inspections or regulatory intervention. With $40 billion of taxpayers’ money at stake, this is a significant weakness.”
Chartered Accountant and Attorney, Christopher Ram
Ram went on to point out that governance is another concern. The lawyer explained that the Bill tabled in the National Assembly lays the foundation for the Finance Minister to appoint all directors, including the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson. ‘That concentration of authority is particularly troubling given his well-documented history of delayed appointments to statutory bodies and institutions under his oversight. Ironically, the same Minister was once a vocal critic of similar shortcomings when they occurred under the previous administration,” Ram said.
Additionally, the attorney noted that the Guyana Development Bank also falls outside of the Companies Act. As such, the lawyer flagged that the legislation contains no statutory indemnity for directors acting in good faith and omits many of the governance safeguards normally associated with corporate entities.
Kaieteur News reported in an article on Sunday that no penalties have been included for rogue banking officials that may seek kickbacks or special favours for granting loans to members of the public.
Equally concerning for the attorney is the areas not covered by the Bill. Ram said, “It establishes a $40 billion development bank without identifying lending priorities or sectors that should be targeted.”
Additionally, Ram highlighted that the proposed law does not explain how losses will be financed or risks shared in co-financing arrangements.
He concluded, “There is a good idea at the heart of this Bill. Unfortunately, a good idea is not a substitute for good legislation. A Development Bank entrusted with $40 billion of public funds requires stronger governance, clearer accountability and independent oversight.” Consequently, Ram suggested that the Bill needed more consultation and scrutiny before being laid in the National Assembly.
Proposed legislation to govern the Guyana Development Bank was on Friday afternoon tabled in the National Assembly by an energetic Finance Minister, Dr. Ashni Kumar Singh.
News of the financial institution sparked excitement among Guyanese as the Government of Guyana (GoG) marketed the facility as one that would offer zero interest on loans up to $3 million with no collateral required.
The legal framework however reveals a different picture than that promised by government.
According to Section 5 (2) of the Bill, “Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Bank may- (a) assist small and medium-sized enterprises in establishing, carrying on or expanding their operations by providing loans with or without collateral and with or without charging interest.”
The proposed law does not clearly outline what specific projects will require collateral or attract interest and at what specific rates.
Moreover, $40B or approximately US$200M initially – as the sum can be revised in Parliament – will be disbursed at the sole discretion of government appointees. The Bill makes no provision for any nominees to be submitted by the Opposition, civil society or any transparency bodies, raising concerns over the direct control of billions by the administration and the likelihood of selection based on “political alliance”.
Road to First Oil – Every Man, Woman and Child Must Become Oil-minded. Column No. 187: June 7, 2026
From Upper Mazaruni to Gas-to-Energy: A history of failures
For almost every decade since Independence, Guyana has produced a project that promised transformation and delivered disappointment, and sometimes disaster. The 1970s had the Upper Mazaruni hydroelectric scheme and the Feed, Clothe and House programme. Later came nationalisation followed by Skeldon, Amaila Falls, the Specialty Hospital and a succession of initiatives that were supposed to alter the country’s economic future. Different leaders conceived them. Different ideologies inspired them. Different circumstances surrounded them. Yet they shared a common characteristic. They all promised transformation only to founder on the rocks of poor planning, weak financial management and inadequate execution.
The problem was seldom ambition. Guyana has never lacked ambition. Governments of every political persuasion have demonstrated a willingness to think big, spend big and promise big. The recurring weakness has been the inability to convert these into results. Costs exceed estimates. Timelines slip. Financing arrangements change. Assumptions prove unrealistic. Expectations outrun capacity. Some projects fail outright. Others survive but deliver substantially less than promised. The lesson from half a century of experience is not that Guyana should stop thinking big. It is that vision without planning, discipline and execution is often an expensive illusion.
That history deserves attention as the Government returned to Parliament this week seeking an additional $54.9 billion, including approximately $19 billion for the Gas-to-Energy Project. The issue is not the legality of supplementary appropriations. Governments sometimes require additional resources during the course of a fiscal year. The issue is competence. Four months after Parliament approved a budget of $1.558 trillion, one of the most important projects in the country’s history requires another substantial injection of public money.
If there is one project in Guyana whose financing requirements and implementation timetable ought to be known with a high degree of certainty, it is this one. It is expected to come on stream this year. As projects move towards completion, uncertainty should diminish rather than increase. Contracts are in execution. Costs should be clearer. Financing requirements should be better understood. Mature projects should become easier to forecast.
What makes the situation particularly troubling is that no project in Guyana’s history has enjoyed greater advantages, and limitless resources. President Ali retains responsibility for finance and remains the ultimate custodian of the country’s fiscal architecture. Vice President Jagdeo owns the policy dimensions of the project and has been its most visible advocate. Prime Minister Phillips is responsible for its execution and implementation. Dr Ashni Singh is responsible for financing, budgeting and appropriations. Few projects have enjoyed such concentrated political oversight. Few projects have had access to so much expertise, authority and information. If any project should have benefited from rigorous forecasting, disciplined budgeting and careful financial management, it is this one.
Yet four months after Parliament approved the budget, the Government is seeking another $19 billion for the project. The significance of that request lies not in the amount itself. Guyana has the money. Oil revenues have altered that reality. The significance lies in what the request reveals about the systems responsible for planning, forecasting and managing public expenditure.
Dr Ashni Singh has built his public reputation on competence in fiscal management. Few ministers have projected greater confidence in their command of public finance, budgeting and macroeconomic management. Guyanese have repeatedly been invited to judge the Government’s stewardship by the quality of its management of the public finances. The supplementary request therefore raises an unavoidable question. Were the original estimates wrong, or was Parliament presented with figures that should never have inspired confidence in the first place? Neither answer reflects well on those responsible for preparing and defending the numbers.
In any serious organisation, a variance of this magnitude on a flagship investment would trigger difficult questions. How were the original estimates prepared? What assumptions proved wrong? Why were the financing requirements not foreseen? What controls failed? Yet in Guyana’s public sector, departures from approved estimates increasingly risk becoming normalised. The danger is not the additional expenditure itself. The danger is the gradual acceptance of lower standards of planning and accountability, at the highest levels of the Administration.
The implications extend far beyond Gas-to-Energy. If the State encounters difficulties forecasting the financing requirements of a project receiving direct attention from the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, what should citizens expect elsewhere? Should anyone be surprised when problems emerge at NDIA, CHPA, GPL, GWI, Public Works or the regional administrations? Those agencies operate with fewer resources, less political attention and weaker technical capacity. Gas-to-Energy should represent the gold standard of public administration. If the gold standard itself is revealing weaknesses in planning and execution, then the deficiencies evident elsewhere in the public sector do not surprise.
For decades governments explained failure by reference to a shortage of resources. That excuse has disappeared. Guyana now has money. It has access to technical expertise and advice. It has political stability. Most importantly, it has a project that enjoys the direct attention of the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance.
If under those circumstances one of the country’s most important projects still requires an additional $19 billion only months after the budget was approved, then Parliament and the public are entitled to ask difficult questions. Not about the project alone, but about the quality of the planning, budgeting and financial management that underpin it. And they expect answers from those responsible.
The Government has assembled what it should regard as its strongest team. The project has enjoyed every conceivable advantage. If this is the outcome, then the problem lies beyond money and resources. That is the ultimate disaster.
This column first appeared on chrisram.net. It is reproduced with the courtesy of its author.